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ABSTRACT 
 For centuries, militaries throughout the world have used deception techniques to 
gain competitive advantage in warfare. This thesis evaluated the effect of deception with 
a particular commercial product within cyberspace. It measured the effect of its deception 
on the ability of attackers to achieve their objectives. The results of our experiments 
showed the deception could slow cyber-attacks. These results also suggested several 
future research opportunities and implementation strategies for deception in cyberspace 
operations. 
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All warfare is based on deception. 
—Sun Tzu, The Art of War 
 
The initial ground offensive of Operation Desert Storm in February of 1991 is 
considered one of the most successful uses of military deception on record. It aimed at 
reinforcing the belief in a U.S. ground and amphibious assault from southern and eastern 
borders of Iraq. Deceptions included conducting training exercises close to the borders, 
amphibious landing drills by U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, and information operations 
targeting Iraqi intelligence and leadership suggesting where their assault would launch 
from. Meanwhile, two U.S. Airborne Corps units relocated to the western flank in 
preparation to conduct an envelopment maneuver, a military tactic used to seize objectives 
to an enemy’s rear while denying their ability to withdraw (Wright, 2020). The more the 
Iraqi forces positioned their defenses to their southern and eastern borders, the more the 
U.S. used overt actions to reinforce the belief of an imminent attack at those locations. 
These actions included camouflaged decoy tanks, communication emulators, and various 
other psychological tactics to convince the Iraqis that the U.S. was staging a significantly 
large military presence at the southern border. 
This strategy of deception was based primarily on Magruder’s principle of the 
exploitation of preconception which states “it is generally easier to induce an opponent to 
maintain a preexisting belief than to present notional evidence to change that belief” (Joint 
Chiefs of Staff [JCS], 2017, A-1). On February 24, 1991, the assault began as planned with 
the “left flank” of the Iraqis exposed as the U.S. troops met minimal resistance. The overall 
plan was so effective that within 100 hours of its start, the entire ground force had achieved 
virtually all of its objectives (Wright, 2020). The deceptive nature of this operation was 
successful despite the complexity of interplay between multiple domains of warfare on the 
U.S. military side and a lack of control over the Iraqi military defenses. With that in mind, 
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this thesis explores how military deception theory and its associated techniques affect 
operations in the new and emerging domain of cyberspace. 
This research evaluated the effect of deception within a simulated cyberspace 
domain. Background information on military deception theory, cyberspace operations, and 
the concept of deception in cyberspace will be discussed first to provide the appropriate 
context for the research. Following this, I examine the related research on cyberspace 
deception, particularly research involving game theory or that included real-world 
cyberspace operators. After this review, the methods for this experiment will be explained, 
including the criteria and metrics used in the analysis of the results. Next, a quantitative 
and qualitative analysis of the results will be presented. This research concludes with 
additional considerations and recommendations for future work in this subject area.  
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. MILITARY DECEPTION 
Fundamentally, deception is a method of convincing others to believe a false idea 
which can result in either a specific action or inaction. It influences the attitudes and 
behaviors of those being deceived to invoke a response that directly aids the deceiver. A 
well-known theory of deception identifies two categories: displaying that which is false 
and concealing that which is true (Bell and Whaley, 1991). Military deception (MILDEC) 
aims to alter how an adversary views, analyzes, decides, and acts (JCS, 2017). MILDEC is 
a type of military “information operation” which focuses on influencing the decision-
making process of adversaries while protecting that of your own. MILDEC can be 
implemented at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of warfare. It is planned and 
executed following the six primary principles shown in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1. Six Tenets. Source: JCS (2017). 
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The planning of MILDEC occurs in five steps. First, mission analysis is conducted 
to determine if deception should be a part of the military operation or campaign. Next, a 
concept for the deception is developed to help achieve the commander’s intent and mission 
objectives. Afterward, one course of action (COA) is selected and approved. Following the 
COA selection, a deception plan is developed that must be credible, flexible, and correctly 
timed to have a high probability of success (Latimer, 2003). Last, a review of the overall 
plan is conducted before its implementation.  
Success for any deception operation depends heavily on a few key factors. Initially, 
a deceiver must thoroughly understand their adversary. Moreover, since MILDEC is 
typically focused on the leadership of an adversary, understanding of their mindset from 
intelligence information is key. Security of the deception is essential to ensuring success; 
both the operational plan which focuses on the deceiver’s true intentions as well as the 
deception plan must be protected (Latimer, 2001). Also, the channels used to transmit the 
deception must be carefully chosen by the deceiver to have the best chance of reaching the 
target and being interpreted correctly. Lastly, the feedback from the target must be timely 
and systematically analyzed to allow for necessary adjustments to the deception plan. 
B. CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS 
Cyberspace, classified as the fifth domain of warfighting by the Department of 
Defense (DOD), is an increasingly interconnected, complex, and technology-driven 
environment that presents unique challenges for military operations. Conventional military 
capability (measured in numbers, weapons, and resources) is often of negligible importance 
in the cyberspace domain as strategy and tactics are more important and can give a 
competitive advantage to an otherwise weaker opponent. As in all domains of war, a well-
thought-out and comprehensive strategy is essential to mission accomplishment. Within 
the traditional domains (air, land, maritime, and space), deception tactics and techniques 
are critical elements in the planning and execution of operations.  
Cyberspace operations (CO) are defined by Joint Publication 3-12 as the 
“employment of cyberspace capabilities where the primary purpose is to achieve objectives 
in or through cyberspace.” The three types of cyberspace operations within the DOD are 
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offensive, defensive and Department of Defense Information Network (DODIN) 
operations. This thesis focuses on the interaction between offensive and defensive 
operations. Offensive operations project power in and through adversary cyberspace terrain 
while defensive operations protect one’s own cyber resources against adversarial threats. 
DODIN operations include actions required to build, maintain, and securely operate 
networks to ensure confidentiality, integrity, and availability (JCS, 2018). 
The cyberspace domain depends on the information environment to support 
operations being conducted in the other warfighting domains. Also, cyberspace operations 
can affect the dynamic other domains in the same way that traditional military operations 
can affect cyber domain. Cyberspace has complexity across the three interrelated layers of 
physical, logical, and cyber-persona (JCS, 2018). This complexity allows for a wide range 
of targeting options for cyber-attacks, but also increases the surface area for attacks we 
must defend. The reliance on information and feedback in the cyberspace domain make it 
highly susceptible to deception.  
C. CYBERSPACE DECEPTION 
Cyberspace deception has gained attention over the past decade. The consensus is 
that cyberspace is an offense-dominated environment in which defense is at a disadvantage 
(Lindsay and Gartzke, 2016). Nonetheless, deceptive strategies can bring a balance to 
cyberspace. Traditionally, computer systems and other devices within cyberspace (e.g., 
network and mobile devices) provide accurate information about themselves for operation 
and administration. Moreover, most computer systems are, by design, deterministic in 
nature. Therefore, the cyberspace domain, containing systems and networks that rely on 
the sharing of information to make decisions, is prime for deception. Cyberspace deception 
can be used in each type of cyber operations to enhance their effectiveness and decrease 
the adversary’s ability to achieve their objectives.  
Deception in cyberspace is conducted like traditional MILDEC operations. The key 
factors required for a successful deception operation mentioned earlier still hold true. 
Similarly, the benefits of MILDEC being a force multiplier, mission enhancer, and strategic 
enabler apply within the cyberspace domain as well. The traditional military taxonomies 
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of deception can also be applied to its use in cyberspace. Lies, camouflage, displays or 
decoys, and disinformation are useful types of deception that can be executed within 
cyberspace. As mentioned above, computer systems are typically designed to provide 
accurate information to users or administrators. Therefore, lies can deceive by intentionally 
providing false information. Lies are distinguished from disinformation as they are answers 
to queries or request for information, whereas disinformation is provided without the 
requirement for being requested (Rowe, 2016). Camouflage and decoys, the two types of 
deception in this research, can cause expenditure of resources from an adversary. For 
example, changing a name of an important file or system, to cause the adversary to spend 
more time and resources to verify its true identity, is a camouflage deception in cyberspace. 
Similarly, creating replica systems on a network that serve no purpose other than adding 
complexity to confuse adversaries, is an example of how decoys can be implemented.  
Those examples were primarily for use in defensive cyber operations. They help 
the defender achieve a key objective, ensuring that detection plus response times of the 
defender remains less than the overall attack time. With deception, defenders have a higher 
probability of successfully defending and responding to an attack as it can increase the 
amount of time it takes an adversary to complete their objectives. Furthermore, the 
deception techniques of decoys, honeypots, and honeynets decrease false positives as any 
interaction with them not by the defender should not occur. The next section will explore 
the most relevant research on the use and evaluation of cyberspace deception. 
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III. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. CASE FOR CYBERSPACE DECEPTION 
The case for deception in cyberspace operations begins with the historical success 
of military deception in the history of warfare. From the Battle of Cannae during the Second 
Punic War, to Operation Barbarossa during World War II, and, more recently, Operation 
Left Hook in Operation Desert Storm, deception has been a key strategy to gain the 
competitive advantage in military operations. Throughout history, many lessons have been 
learned and guidelines developed for deception in warfare (Monroe, 2012). As the 
Information Revolution continues, the reliance on information systems by nations and their 
militaries also increases, creating a capability and vulnerability paradox (Schneider, 2019). 
All actions within cyberspace depend on the storing, processing, or transmitting of 
information from these systems, which introduce opportunities for deception.  
Another benefit of using deception in cyberspace is that it can bring stability to the 
domain (Gartzke and Lindsey, 2016). From an offensive perspective, intrusions and other 
cyber-attacks rely heavily on deception. Defensively, deception can cause uncertainty for 
attackers who may not be able to tell whether or not they are receiving accurate 
information. This uncertainty can create stability within the domain, as attackers will be 
less likely expend resources in environments where deception may be presence. This 
perspective challenges the notion of cyberspace as an offense-dominant domain by using 
deception to confuse and trap attackers (Gartzke and Lindsey, 2015). Furthermore, the 
prevalence of cyber espionage activities increases opportunities for deception in 
cyberspace (Valeriano et al., 2018).  
Taxonomies for traditional deception practices apply to cyberspace (Rowe and 
Rothstein, 2004). A variety of deception techniques can achieve more effective detection 
and defense for cyber-attacks (Han, Kheir, and Balzarotti, 2018). A more thorough 
explanation of these concepts with considerations for the laws and ethics of cyberspace 
deception are discussed in (Rowe and Rrushi, 2016). Active cyber defense and modeling 
strategies for the planning and execution of cyberspace deception are discussed in (Jajodia 
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et al., 2016). Furthermore, specific circumstances for the use of cyberspace deception are 
explored with use cases and models for implementation in (Heckman et al., 2015).  
B. RELATED WORK 
Integrating deception into the cyberspace domain is not new, but most research 
focuses on a single perspective. For example, using real and fake results in network scans 
can confuse an attacker conducting reconnaissance of a network (Jajodia et. al., 2016).  
One type of research uses a game-theoretic analysis with complex algorithms to determine 
the effective techniques of deception in a simulated environment (Wang and Lu, 2018). 
Another variant using game theory evaluates an optimal defender strategy against powerful 
adversaries in a cyber deception game (Fang et. al. 2018). Lastly, game theory can evaluate 
the technique of concealing decoys and can enhance the effectiveness of cyberspace 
deception (Miah et al., 2020).  
An important design element of cyberspace conflict scenarios is attack modeling. 
Most approaches model the interplay between cyber-attacks and the opposing defense 
measures. One method of attack modeling focuses on a set of conditions, primarily trust 
and availability, used in defining effects on human behavior of cyber-attacks (Cayirci and 
Ghergherehchi, 2011). Another approach uses attack graphs for visual representation of 
cyber-attacks that exploit vulnerabilities within networks. The complexity of these graphs, 
due to the size and scale of networks today, requires significant efforts in their generation 
(Liu et al., 2012). A goal of attack modeling is to determine an attacker’s intent and 
objectives and determine the best defensive strategies to use against them. Research and 
experiments conducted using costs and incentive-based methodologies show promise to 
deduce this type of information (Liu, Zang, and Yu, 2005) 
Another way to evaluate deception in cyberspace involves real networks and human 
operators instead of simulated agents. A large study, Tularosa, included over 130 red teams 
to help assess how defensive deception affects cyber attackers (Ferguson-Walter et al., 
2018). This study consisted of questionnaires, cognitive tasks, and measurements of 
physiological effects to determine the extent deception affected participants. The first part 
of the study detailed the experimental design, implementation, and limitations while the 
9 
second portion (currently still being analyzed) will explain the findings (Ferguson-Walter 
et. al., 2018). Another study explored how deception affected humans in an experiment 
with four variants (Ferguson-Walter et al., 2017). The first variant investigated whether 
decoys alone were enough to deceive the red team, while the second told the red team 
members that deception could be present in the environment. The third variant told red 
team members that deception was present in the environment however, no deception 
techniques were activated. Lastly, for the fourth variant, the red team members were given 
complete knowledge of the environment including how the deceptive techniques worked. 
The intent was to determine how the actual presence of deception compared to the 
knowledge of deception. 
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The Cyberspace Course of Action Tool (CCAT) was developed by Soar 
Technology Inc. (located in Ann Arbor, MI), and funded by the Defense Advanced 
Research Projects Agency, to support research for military decision-making in the 
cyberspace domain (SoarTech). CCAT was used in this research to evaluate the effect of 
deception in cyberspace by developing and executing a cyber wargame scenario in a 
simulated environment. In collaboration with SoarTech, I created the scenario design and 
components, agent actions, deceptions, and evaluation metrics specifically for this 
research. The specifics of each are 
B. SCENARIO DESIGN 
The scenario was designed to emulate a cyber wargame using simulated attacker 
and defender agents. The two objectives for each model were for the attacker agent to 
exfiltrate the personally identifiable information (PII) file “PII.txt,” and to corrupt or 
destroy the “sysconfig.conf” file on the Program of Record (POR) server. The POR server 
simulated a mission-critical server commonly found in operational military networks. The 
PII.txt file simulated a military roster with PII data (e.g., social security numbers, 
addresses, phone numbers, and blood type). The “sysconfig.conf” file simulated a system 
file used for running a critical service on the POR server.  
The experiment consisted of four variant models in which the attacker and defender 
agents competed against each other. Variant One was the control experiment and provided 
baseline metrics of how each agent performed in a direct engagement. Variant Two 
contained two decoy servers and two decoy files. Variant Three included two instances of 
camouflage: the PII.txt and the sysconfig.conf files were both renamed. Finally, the 
previous two variants were combined to create the fourth variant. Variant Four also allowed 
the defender agent to deploy additional decoy or camouflage tactics, if desired. The variants 
and their associated techniques are: 
• Variant One: No deception 
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• Variant Two: Decoys  
• Variant Three: Camouflage 
• Variant Four: Decoys and camouflage  
The decision process for the agents was based on Empirical Game-Theoretic 
Analysis, specifically a version called “double oracle” that also included deep 
reinforcement learning (DO-EGTA with RL) (Wright et al., 2019). This method iterates 
over a series of two-player games learning the best strategies for each side. Before the 
evaluation games, both attacker and defender agents underwent training which consisted 
of them attempting various actions in different sequences to determine a strategy. The 
optimal strategy for an agent, despite any strategy used by their opponent, is called the 
Nash equilibrium (NE). To determine what agent strategies would be used for the 
evaluation period, a sample of strategies derived from the training period were compared 
to the computed Nash equilibrium; the strategies, for both attacker and defender agents, 
closest to the equilibrium were selected for the evaluation. The time limitations for 
experimentation did not permit evaluation of all strategies. Instead, this experiment 
sampled strategies that resulted from the training period. The time required to train an agent 
depends on the hardware and resources available, including system processing power and 
storage capacity (see Chapter VI).  
C. SCENARIO COMPONENTS 
1. Network Map 
The network used for this scenario, seen in Figure 2, simulated a scaled-down 
version of a standard military network with traditional security components, segmentation, 
devices, and services. It consisted of three virtual local area networks (VLANs) containing 
servers, workstations, a firewall, and networking devices commonly found on a small 
military network. The demilitarized zone (DMZ) VLAN contained a network boundary 
firewall and router. The DMZ VLAN also included three front-end servers supporting 
email, web services, and applications which acted as proxies to their back-end server 
counterparts in the server VLAN. This configuration required the attacker to exploit the 
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front-end servers to access the back-end servers where the objective files were located. The 
user VLAN contained one router, two standard Windows client (WinCli) machines and 
one WinCli administrator machine. Two POR client (PORCli) machines in this VLAN had 
direct access to the POR servers in the server network. Lastly, the server VLAN contained 
one router, two domain controllers, two web database servers (webserver back-ends), two 
file servers, two POR servers, one mail (back-end), and one application server (back-end). 
The goal nodes on the map (the servers that contain the objective files) are indicated in 
gold, and the decoy servers are indicated in blue.  
  
Figure 2. Scenario Network Map 
2. Flowcharts 
The attack flowchart in Figure 3 and defender flowchart in Figure 4 were created 
in collaboration with SoarTech to show the cyber scenario from the attacker’s and the 
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defender’s perspectives, respectively. Actions available to the agents are indicated by 
squares. After an action is selected, a security condition indicated by a circle will become 
available if that action was executed successful. Security conditions represent information 
about the network or an asset on the network (i.e., a web server or the application port of a 
web server). The probability of an action being executed successfully depends on the 
complexity of the action; thus, more complex actions have a slightly lower probability of 
success. Also, an element of randomness is factored into the environment which simulates 
the uncertain nature of cyberspace attacks and defenses operating as intended. All security 
conditions resulting from the attacker’s actions can be seen by both the attacker and 
defender agents; however, the defender security conditions are hidden from the attacker. 
The attacker flowchart (Figure 3) was created to represent a streamlined version of the 
standard cyber kill chain combined with several tactics and techniques from the MITRE 
ATT&CK framework (MITRE, 2020). The box in Figure 3 delineates actions conducted 
on the defender network (inside the box) and actions the attacker would conduct outside 
on its own network. The MITRE ATT&CK framework was also used to develop the actions 
in defender flowchart (Figure 4) to best defend against the attacker actions. All defender 




Figure 3. Attacker Flowchart 
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Figure 4. Defender Flowchart 
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D. AGENT ACTIONS 
This section describes the actions that were available to the attacker and the 
defender agents during the experiment. Each action selected by the attacker has an 
associated cost that is subtracted from the overall score at the end of the game (see Table 
1). Each objective for the attacker has a reward value which is added to the attacker’s 
overall score. Similarly, the defender has costs associated with their actions that are also 
detailed in Table 1. Each agent can attempt as many actions as they want during a turn as 
long as that action is available (i.e., the action becomes available based upon successful 
completion of prerequisite actions). 
Table 1. Costs and Rewards  
 
18 
1. Attacker Actions 
The first actions the attacker agent can select are preparatory in nature. The 
“Determine Decoy” action assesses the probability of decoys within the environment, and 
the “Switch IP Address” action will temporarily prevent the defender agent from blocking 
the attack. Following this, the attacker can only choose the “Map Network” action, which 
is a type of network reconnaissance. This action simulates a probing scan on a target 
network. If successful, the security conditions for the servers in the DMZ subnet and their 
open ports are displayed.  
The next possible actions represent the initial access stage where an attacker 
chooses a specific attack action, based on its availability, to gain entry into the network. 
The five actions available include two spear-phishing email actions (link and attachment), 
two exploits of public-facing applications (one by the database port of the mail server and 
one by the application port on the application server), and an inventory (web crawl) on the 
web server by use of its Hypertext Transport Protocol (HTTP) port. If any of these actions 
are successful, a security condition will appear for an asset in either the server VLAN or 
the user VLAN, depending on which action was chosen. For example, if either spear-
phishing action is selected and executed successfully, a security condition for a WinCli 
user becomes available. Similarly, if the web crawl action is selected, the security condition 
for the web server (back-end) in the server VLAN becomes available. 
The next stage includes a set of discovery actions used by the attacker to identify 
more information about the network and assets. These actions will be performed only on 
the assets identified by the preceding security conditions available. The first action is 
“Discover Local Network” which will show other assets on the same VLAN. A special 
variant of this action is “Discover Local Network (Unvisited)” which will only show only 
assets not previously selected. The security information obtained as a result of these two 
actions are the network addresses of the assets within the VLAN. The next action available 
is “Discover User,” which queries an asset to determine what user accounts reside on it and 
returns with a security condition for each account successfully identified. Also, this action 
may result in the identification of an administrative user who can access more information. 
The “Discover Processes” action queries the local asset to find running processes and 
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returns a list of those processes if successful. The last two actions in this stage are “Search 
Local Data,” which identifies files in the asset, and “Determine Decoy,,” which tests 
whether an asset is a decoy. The first can result in two security conditions, PII data and 
critical data, while the latter returns a security condition indicating if the asset is a decoy 
device or not. 
The subsequent stage contains privilege-escalation and lateral-movement actions 
for the attacker. The “Get Hashes” attempts to dump the password hashes from a selected 
user account or administrative account. If the “Get Hashes” action executes successfully, 
it provides the attacker a user account or administrative account to use in follow-on actions. 
Next, the “Exec WinRm Lat Mov” and “Pass the Hash (Lat Mov)” actions represent two 
ways to move laterally to a different asset within the VLAN. The “Process Injection” action 
simulates the attacker migrating from a process with user level privileges to one with 
administrator privileges. Lastly, the “Get Info” action determines whether the file being 
queried is the correct one needed for the objective. 
The last set of attacker actions comprise the “impact” stage. The first of these 
actions includes “Search Local Data,” which tells the agent if the PII file is on the current 
asset and “Destroy Server” which disables the POR server. The last two actions in this 
stage are “Exfil Encrypt” and “Exfil C2” which simulate the exfiltration of the PII.txt file 
by an encrypted channel or command and control channel, respectively.  
2. Defender Actions 
Figure 4 depicts the types of defender actions available: traditional defensive 
measures and deception techniques. The overall goals for the defender are to identify the 
actions the attacker has completed, try to restrict future actions, and ultimately prevent the 
attacker from achieving its objectives. At the start of each game, the defender can select 
from six defensive actions which begins at the defender’s root (located in the center of 
Figure 4). The file monitoring action checks whether a specific file has been accessed by 
the attacker. Process monitoring looks for malicious processes or specific processes that 
indicate the attacker has performed a “Get Hashes” action. The “Audit Logon Events” 
action shows if a suspicious administrator login or a lateral move has been conducted by 
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the attacker agent. This is followed by the “Audit HIPS Logs” action, which checks the 
host’s intrusion-prevention-system logs for indicators of malicious activity or critical files 
being accessed. The “Check Firewall Alerts” action indicates that the attacker has 
successfully executed either a spear-phishing attack action or the “Map Network” activity. 
The final action initially available to the defender is “Monitor Network Traffic” which 
identifies exfiltration of information by encrypted traffic and other malicious indicators 
throughout the network. 
Subsequent defender actions use more active measures to protect the network and 
prevent attacker from achieving their objectives. These actions include disabling a user or 
administrator account, resetting a password, or disabling email links (which blocks the 
attacker’s ability to choose that spear-phishing action). Also, the “Enforce Robots.txt” 
action impedes the attacker’s use of web crawling, while the “Block IP Addresses” action 
prevents all internal and external traffic from the attacker. If successful, the “Block IP 
Addresses” action will require the attacker to execute the “Change IP Address” action to 
resume its attack. The last level for defender actions contain two actions to be used as a 
last resort. The first is re-imaging of the asset which resets the asset to its initial state and 
removes all attacker progress. The final action isolates the asset, which prevents any 
network connections, making the asset unreachable.  
All defender actions listed above are traditional defense measures. The actions 
located below the “Defender Root” security condition in Figure 4 show the deceptions and 
their associated security conditions. Each action relates to either the decoy or camouflage 
technique. Some actions can be used more than once; for instance, the “Change File Name” 
can be selected under multiple security conditions to apply to different files. Another 
example of an action that can be used more than once is “Modify Attractiveness Score” 
which allows a defender to change how the attacker agent views a decoy. A higher score 
will increase the probability of the attacker choosing that action.  
Decoy deceptions mimic or copy legitimate resources. They add complexity and 
confusion, causing uncertainty and requiring more time for an adversary to verify 
information. This experiment used decoy servers and decoy files. The decoy servers 
mimicked File Server 1 (FS1) and the Program of Record (POR) Server 1. The decoy files 
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mirrored the files directly attached to the attacker’s objectives, PII.txt and sysconfig.conf. 
Camouflage renamed them as Camo_PII.txt and Camo_Sysconfig.conf. The purpose of 
this deception was to make the attacker spend more resources (such as time) in identifying 
the true nature of the file, thereby increasing the defender’s chance to detect the attacker 
and respond with preventive actions. 
E. EVALUATION CRITERIA AND METRICS 
Several factors were considered to evaluate the success of the deception during the 
experiment. These factors are: 
• What type of cyberspace operation could the deception support: offensive, 
defensive, or traditional military operations?  
• What background experience and knowledge did each agent have; for 
instance, were the agents previously trained in the environment or did they 
know of the other agents’ capabilities?  
• How much of the agent strategy related to deception, and what was its 
goal? 
• How many additional resources or costs were used during the wargame on 
both sides? For instance, how much time was spent by the attacker to 
determine if deception was being used?  
• How much did each deceptive technique affect the ability of the opponent 
to achieve their objectives?  
• How much did each deceptive technique affect the agent’s choice of 
actions and its overall strategy? 
• Which actions were chosen most frequently by the agents? 
The metrics described next were chosen to quantify the above criteria. 
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• Overall score: Total points (positive or negative) received by an agent for 
successful and unsuccessful actions. 
• Action frequency: The number of times an action was taken in the game. 
• Timesteps: The number of turns taken in a game by an agent. 
• Objective accomplishment: Whether an agent successfully achieved an 
objective. By default, a defender agent does not accomplish its objective if 
the attacker agent achieves either of its objectives. 
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V. EXPERIMENTS, RESULTS, AND DISCUSSION 
Before the evaluation portion of the experiment, each agent was trained to be more 
intelligent, efficient, and effective. The training for each scenario was done in parallel on 
a cloud-computing platform and lasted approximately 3 weeks. The resources to train the 
agents and evaluate them were one CentOS 7 core server with an i7-7820X processor at 
3.60GHz, 8 cores, 128 gigabyte random access memory, and two Nvidia Tesla V100 32 
gigabyte graphical processing units. The evaluation period consisted of 100 games, per 
variant, between the fully trained attacker and defender agents whose strategies were 
closest to the Nash Equilibrium. The results of the evaluation indicated the effect of 
deception in the variants using the metrics described previously.  
The overall score metric determines the total cost (i.e., resources) spent and the 
rewards received (i.e., goals) for each agent during the game. Rewards are only granted to 
the attacker if it achieves an objective; therefore, the defender’s overall score will always 
be a negative value. Also, any reward value the attacker receives will be considered a cost 
to the defender and deducted from its overall score. Therefore, the effectiveness and 
efficiency of both the attacker and defender agents can be evaluated based on how low 
their overall score value is at the end of each game.  
The number of times an action is taken by both agents was recorded and then 
averaged to determine each action’s frequency. This metric indicates which actions each 
agent used most and how deception affected their choice of actions. The timestep metric 
was calculated based on the number of turns each agent played during a game until an 
objective was achieved. The maximum number of timesteps allowed in a game was set at 
40. The average number of timesteps per variant was then calculated to determine how 
each implementation of deception affected the attacker’s time. The final metric, mission 
accomplishment, tracked whether the attacker agent achieved any objective during the 
game. This metric was separated into two categories as there were two objectives: (1) 
exfiltration of data and (2) corruption or destruction of the POR server. The raw results for 
action frequency, overall score, objective accomplishment, and timestep counts are 
provided in the experiment results section of the appendix. Increases from the baseline 
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variant are highlighted in green, decreases are highlighted in red, blue indicates there was 
no change from the baseline, and black indicates the timestep limit of 40 was reached 
without the attacker achieving an objective. 
A. VARIANT ONE—NO DECEPTION 
This initial variant was used as a baseline for comparison with the three other 
variants in which deception techniques were implemented. The average defender score for 
this baseline variant was -3849.75. This was the defenders lowest average score across the 
four variants, indicating that the defender’s costs increased when deception was introduced. 
The average attacker score was -1534.15 for the baseline variant. As with the defender, this 
score was the lowest for the attacker across all variants, which indicates the attacker 
incurred (as expected) more costs during variants containing a type of deception. 
An average of 174 actions were taken by the attacker during this variant. The most 
frequent action by the attacker was the “Discover Local Network” which was selected an 
average of 20 times per game. The action chosen the fewest amount of times by the attacker 
was the “Spear-phishing Link” with an average of four times a game. The defender selected 
the “Process Monitoring” action most often with an average of 13 times per game, while 
the “Isolate Machine” was the least selected, averaging only one selection per game. The 
defender agent executed an average of 93 actions per game during this variant. Lastly, the 
average number of timesteps to complete each objective were 25 and 32 for the exfiltration 
and corruption/destruction objectives, respectfully.  
B. DECEPTION VARIANTS 
The overall scores for both attacker and defender agents in the deception variants 
decreased as compared to each of their baselines. The decoy variant decreased the average 
score of the defender by over 300 points, which was the largest change recorded across all 
deception variants. Most of the overall scores for the variants containing deception resulted 
in decreases for both the attacker and defender. The number of games, out of the 100 used 
for the evaluation period, that resulted in a decreased overall score are displayed in Table 
2 (i.e., the percentage of time a game resulted in a lower score compared to the baseline).  
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Table 2. Percentage of Time Score Decreased (100 Games) 
 Camouflage Decoy Hybrid 
Attacker 66% 53% 61% 
Defender 57% 64% 57% 
 
The average number of actions taken for the attacker and defender increased from 
the baseline in each deception variant. For the attacker agent, there was an average increase 
of approximately 20 actions per game whereas the defender’s average increase was only 
10. The “Exploit Public-Facing Mail” action was chosen the least with an average of one 
selection per game. There was no deviation from the baseline in the most frequent action 
selected (Discover Local Network). “Audit Logon Events” was the highest selected action 
by the defender with an average of 11 per game. In contrast, the “Isolate Machine” action 
was never selected by the defender agent during these variants. 
The number of timesteps in the decoy variant for the exfiltration objective was the 
only category to experience a decrease. In all other cases, the average number of timesteps 
increased slightly across all deception variants. The minimal change was less than one 
timestep on average. Despite the small change in timesteps, the percentage of time that the 
attacker successfully achieved their objectives displayed a more significant decrease. For 
the exfiltration objective, success decreased 14% for the attacker, while the corruption and 
destruction objective resulted in a 12% decrease. 
C. DISCUSSION 
Without deception, there was a higher success rate for the attacker agent achieving 
their objectives as compared to the variants with deception techniques present. Moreover, 
the number of average timesteps correlated with the percentage of successful objectives 
achieved. A higher success rate correlates to a lower average in timesteps. Conversely, a 
higher average number of timesteps indicates a lower success rate.  
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The overall scores indicate that the presence of deception caused both the attacker 
and defender agents to incur more costs to achieve their objectives. This result was 
expected as deploying any additional defensive techniques will require more costs for 
defenders. Similarly, the attacker will experience increased costs for the additional 
techniques used to mitigate the presence of the decoy. The defender had a smaller deviation 
than the attacker between the scores in the deception variants as compared to their 
baselines. On average, the defender’s score with deception was 236.93 points higher than 
the baseline, whereas the attackers score with deception was 239.81 points higher. This 
comparison, although minimal, demonstrates that deception affects the overall score of the 
attacker more than the defender.  
The number of average actions taken by the attacker were noticeably higher in the 
variants with deception (approximately 20 more actions per game). These increases are 
evidence that deception techniques can impose additional costs on an attacker, which give 
the defender more opportunities for detection. In total, there were 8 actions the attacker 
increased selection frequency for (i.e., attacker found them to be more successful). The 
attacker decreased frequency in 10 actions. Finally, there were 7 actions where the 
frequency remained equal to its baseline averages. These results indicate the attacker 
considered a higher number of actions to be less effective when operating in a deception 
environment.  
The results from the analysis of the timestamps indicate two things. First, the 
deception techniques increased the average amount of time it took the attacker to achieve 
its objectives. If defenders can use deception to increase the overall attack time, they 
increase the amount of time they have to detect and respond to the attack. Thus, the goal 
of defenders should be to ensure detection and response time remain less than the total 
amount of time for an attacker to reach their objective. Second, deception decreases the 
success rate of attackers achieving their objectives. During the baseline variant, the attacker 
agent achieved its objective 95% of the time for exfiltrating documents and 78% of the 
time for corrupting or destroying the critical server. Deception decreased the attacker’s 
ability to achieve each objective by an average of over 12%.  
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VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
The success of deception in supporting military operations has been well 
documented throughout history. Although the domain of cyberspace brings challenges to 
the traditional approach to warfare, it also presents ample opportunities to use deception. 
The cyberspace domain is built on the need to transmit, process and store information, 
which intrinsically makes it vulnerable to deception. “The internet’s capacity for deception 
is what facilitates its use” (Gartzke and Lindsey, 2015, p. 327). The research in this thesis 
suggested that using deceptive tactics in the cyberspace domain is an effective defensive 
strategy. Furthermore, these techniques can affect real-world attackers significantly, 
particularly in increasing the amount of time required to complete an objective and by 
imposing additional costs.  
Further research should compare game-theoretic results with the experience of 
cyber operators to identify areas in which each approach can be improved. Second, a more 
detailed scenario design and its accompanying components is needed to validate the effects 
of deception with other constraints within a network (e.g., network protocols, inherent 
security measures, and user or administrator interaction). Also, the attacker and defender 
capabilities need to expand to more advanced techniques to determine how these deceptive 
techniques would perform in real-world scenarios. Third, the effect of deception from an 
offensive perspective is necessary to provide a comprehensive evaluation of its 
effectiveness.  
This research provided a framework which can be expanded to identify how well 
deception can be used in other types of cyber operations. Ironically, cyberspace is the most 
modern and complex warfare domain, yet it may benefit the most from one of the oldest 
and simplest tactics in warfare. 
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APPENDIX. EXPERIMENT RESULTS  
The figures in the Appendix show the quantitative results of the 100-game 
evaluation period for each variant: 
A. OVERALL SCORES 
The overall scores, shown in Figures 5–7, display the sum of all costs expended 




Figure 5. Overall Scores Part 1 
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Figure 6. Overall Scores Part 2 
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Figure 7. Overall Scores Part 3 
B. ACTION FREQUENCY 
The action frequency, shown in Figures 8 and 9, displays the all available actions 








Figure 9. Defender Action Frequency 
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C. TIMESTEPS AND OBJECTIVE ACCOMPLISHMENT 
The results for the amount of timesteps required for the attacker to achieve its 
objectives are shown in Figures 10–12.  
 
Figure 10. Timesteps Part 1 
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Figure 11. Timesteps Part 2 
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Figure 12. Timesteps Part 3 
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